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PREVENTING EPIDEMICS.
PROTECTING PEOPLE.
Approximately 76 million Americans -- one in four -- are sickened by foodborne disease each year.  Of these, an estimated 325,000 are 
hospitalized and 5,000 die.1 Medical costs and lost productivity due to foodborne
illnesses are estimated to cost $44 billion annually.2, 3 Major outbreaks can 
also contribute to significant economic losses in the agriculture and food 
retail industries.  
A 2007 public opinion poll conducted by
the Trust for America’s Health (TFAH)
found that 67 percent of Americans are wor-
ried about food safety.5 In fact, concerns
about food safety and food contamination
rank higher than Americans’ concerns
about pandemic flu, biological or chemical
terror attack, and natural disasters, like
Hurricane Katrina.6
The recent E. coli contamination of spinach
and lettuce, concerns about the safety of
farm-raised fish from China, and alarming
reports of cattle slaughter practices have
heightened anxieties about the vulnerability
of the nation’s food supply.  
Studies from the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS), the Institute of Medicine
(IOM), the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO), and the FDA Science Board,
which serves as an advisory committee to
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), have all raised serious concerns
about the system that is responsible for
keeping the country’s food safe.7, 8, 9  
The U.S. food safety system has not been
fundamentally modernized since its incep-
Fixing Food Safety: 
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Experts estimate that most foodborne illnesses could be prevented if the
right measures were taken to improve the U.S. food safety system.  
FOODBORNE ILLNESSES ARE DEFINED AS DISEASES, USUALLY EITHER INFECTIOUS
OR TOXIC IN NATURE, CAUSED BY AGENTS THAT ENTER THE BODY THROUGH THE
INGESTION OF FOOD. EVERY PERSON IS AT RISK OF FOODBORNE ILLNESS.4
-- World Health Organization
“
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While most of the food Americans eat each
day is safe, according to experts, the chance
for getting seriously ill needs to be improved.
In fact, one in four Americans will experi-
ence food borne illness on an annual basis.
Recent outbreaks combined with vulnerabil-
ities identified by the leading experts,
including reports from the GAO, NAS,
IOM, and FDA’s Science Board serve as a
wake up call for policymakers that problems
in the U.S. food safety system must be
addressed now before they become worse.
The “food safety system” includes the gov-
ernment and the food industry.  The food
industry produces, processes, distributes,
and sells food, while the government serves
a regulatory function.
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tion over 100 years ago.  Current food safe-
ty polices are largely based on early twenti-
eth century laws written to deal with con-
cerns that rarely pose significant threats
today because of changes in farming and
processing practices and technologies.10
These outdated concerns receive the bulk of
the national resources devoted to food safe-
ty, and emerging threats are often only
addressed on a piecemeal basis in the after-
math of a crisis.  The result is a fractional-
ized system focusing on antiquated threats,
instead of a strategic approach to protecting
the nation’s food supply through state-of-
the-art technologies, practices, and policies.   
Obsolete laws, misallocation of resources,
and inconsistencies among major food safe-
ty agencies underlie watchdog groups’ calls
for a “fundamental re-examination of the
federal food safety system.”11 In fact, a 2007
GAO report concluded that the federal
oversight of food safety is now one of the
government’s “high risk” programs.  
This report provides an overview of the cur-
rent problems in U.S. food safety and rec-
ommended solutions.  Fixing food safety in
the U.S. will require a collaborative effort by
food producers, processors, distributors,
retailers, and consumers, combined with
strong leadership from the federal, state,
and local government.
Sections of this report include:
I. Top Concerns with the Government’s
Food Safety System;
II.  An Overview of Foodborne Disease
Threats; and
III.  Recommendations
 Reduce foodborne disease in the U.S.;
 Maintain public confidence in food safety and the food supply; and
 Exert international leadership on food safety.
THE GOVERNMENT’S GOALS IN THE FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM ARE TO:
I. Top Concerns With the Government’s Food Safety System  
Most food producers and food companies
take safety issues very seriously.  Historically,
much of the innovation for improving food
safety has come from within the food indus-
try.  However, food producers, processors,
and retailers operate in markets and allo-
cate their resources in response to market
pressures and incentives.  
Government regulatory agencies exist to
balance the public interest with market
forces, taking responsibility for ensuring
that safety comes first.  The role of govern-
ment is to set standards on behalf of the
public and hold companies accountable for
meeting the standards.  
3Inadequate Federal Leadership, Coordination and Resources
Food safety requires strong public-private part-
nerships.  For regulation to be effective, it must
realistically address current industry practices
and structures.  This includes keeping pace
with advances and changes in the industry.
Currently, however, there are a number of
obstacles that impair the ability of the gov-
ernment to carry out these functions effec-
tively.  Key problems that experts have iden-
tified include: 
 Inadequate Federal Leadership,
Coordination, and Resources;
 Outdated Laws and Policies; and
 Limited Federal, State, and Local
Coordination.
Today’s U.S. laws and policies do not meet
the need for a food safety system that protects
the nation’s food supply from farm-to-fork.  
A comprehensive system would use strategic
inspection practices and state-of-the-art sur-
veillance to prevent disease outbreaks and
harmful contaminants in meat, poultry,
seafood, produce, and processed foods that
could lead to human illness.  
A modern, successful food safety strategy must:
 Make prevention of food safety problems
the central focus of the system;
 Update priorities so resources are devot-
ed to the areas of highest hazard and risk;
 Develop uniform best practices and 
standards;
 Invest in research to continually update
practices and standards to keep pace 
with changes in the food supply and the
industry; and
 Shift from the current outdated inspec-
tion practices that focus on end products
and limited inspections at processing
plants to instead strategically inspect foods
throughout the food production and pro-
cessing processes via “control points.”
According to the 2007 GAO report, “the
federal oversight of food safety is fragment-
ed, with 15 agencies collectively administer-
ing at least 30 laws related to food safety.”12
The 4 agencies with the largest roles include
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA)
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS),
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA)
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition
(CFSAN), Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) Office of Prevention, Pesticides and
Toxic Substances (OPPTS), and U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC)
Food Safety Office.
The other agencies involved include:13
 FDA’s Center for Veterinary Medicine; 
 Department of Commerce’s National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS); 
 Department of Treasury’s Customs Service; 
 National Institutes of Health (NIH);
 USDA’s Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS);
 USDA’s U.S. Codex Office;
 USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service
(AMS);
 USDA’s Agricultural Research Service
(ARS);
 USDA’s Cooperative State Research,
Education, and Extension Service
(CSREES);
 USDA’s Economic Research Service
(ERS); and 
 USDA’s Grain Inspection, Packers and
Stockyard Administration (GIPSA).
None of the agencies has ultimate authority
or responsibility, so accountability for the
total system is limited.  No one person in the
4federal government has the oversight and
accountability for carrying out comprehen-
sive, preventive strategies for reducing food-
borne illness.  
The nation lacks an integrated, holistic
approach to ensuring food safety.  The gov-
ernment’s ability to play an effective role in
preventing foodborne illness is severely
undermined by this fragmentation of food
safety responsibilities among many agencies,
each of which operates more or less inde-
pendently with often differing regulatory
approaches.  No agency has statutory
authority or a practical mandate to forge an
integrated strategy that puts research, regu-
latory, and educational tools of government
to work in a coherent way to minimize risks.
In addition, according to GAO, limited
funds restrict the capabilities of food safety
agencies.  The current funds are often not
strategically used to focus on the greatest
threats, because they are supporting the
outdated legacy systems and practices.14
FDA’s CFSAN:  FDA has responsibility for overseeing the safety of all domestic and
imported food with the exceptions of:
 Meat, poultry, and frozen, dried, and liquid eggs, which are under the authority of
USDA’s FSIS.15
USDA’s FSIS:  The mission of FSIS is to serve as “the public health agency in the U.S.
Department of Agriculture responsible for ensuring that the nation’s commercial supply of
meat, poultry, and egg products is safe, wholesome, and correctly labeled and packaged.”16
CDC’s Office of Food Safety:  Surveillance and identification of foodborne illness out-
breaks are among the Food Safety Office’s primary responsibilities. “The role of the
Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response and Surveillance Team (ORST) is to conduct
national surveillance on foodborne infections and outbreaks of foodborne illness and to
assist in the investigation of foodborne disease outbreaks that take place in the United
States or affect its population.”17
EPA’s OPPTS:  The Office of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances (OPPTS) is charged
with protecting public health and the environment from potential risk of pesticides and toxic
chemicals.  The agency “regulates the use of all pesticides in the United States and establishes
maximum levels for pesticide residues in food, thereby safeguarding the nation’s food supply.”18
SEGMENTED RESPONSIBILITIES:  LEAD AGENCIES
5THE PRESIDENT’S [FY 2009] BUDGET BARELY GIVES FDA ENOUGH FUNDS TO
OPERATE AT LAST YEAR’S LEVEL, AND DOES LITTLE TO MAKE UP FOR THE STEADY LOSS
OF STAFFING THAT THE AGENCY HAS ENDURED FOR THE PAST DECADE. INDEED, THIS
OVERSTRETCHED AGENCY HAS LOST 1,000 STAFFERS OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS IN THEIR
FOOD, DRUG AND MEDICAL DEVICE SAFETY PROGRAMS.19
-- Mark McClellan, former FDA commissioner and administrator of the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services
“
”
Resource Shortages
Misaligned Priorities and Resources
FDA’s Food Safety Programs USDA’s Food & Agriculture 
Safety Programs
Scope of Experts estimate that 85 percent Experts estimate less than 
Responsibility of known foodborne illness 15 percent of known foodborne 
outbreaks are associated with illness outbreaks are associated 
FDA-regulated food products.  with USDA-regulated food products
Funding for Food  Fiscal year (FY) 2007:   FY 2007:  $1.02 billion23
Safety Activities $563 million22
 FY 2008: $619 million  FY 2008: $1.07 billion
 Proposed FY 2009:   Proposed FY 2009:  
$661 million $1.09 billion 
Number of Field 
1,700 7,600
Staff or Inspectors
A series of reports have highlighted the
problems resulting from chronic under-
funding of U.S. food safety efforts, particu-
larly those run by FDA.   
A 2008 report by the FDA Science Board’s
Subcommittee on Science and Technology
found that continual underfunding of FDA
has resulted in:
A plethora of inadequacies that threaten our society
-- including but not limited to, inadequate inspec-
tions of manufacturers, a dearth of scientists who
understand emerging new science and technologies,
inability to speed the development of new therapies,
an import system that is badly broken, a food supply
that grows riskier each year, and an information
infrastructure that was identified as a source of risk
in every FDA Center and function.20
In the past three years alone, CFSAN has
lost 20 percent of its science staff and 600
inspectors.
The Subcommittee’s report urged Congress
to increase FDA’s food safety base by $755
million over 5 years, which includes $350 mil-
lion to strengthen imports and $100 million
to strengthen FDA oversight of nutritional
supplements, animal feed, and cosmetics. 
In addition to allocating more federal dol-
lars to food safety, some food safety experts
have called on Congress to authorize FDA to
collect food manufacturer and producer
registration fees and import fees.  These
fees would provide a steady base of revenue
for food safety initiatives.21
*Note: The increases in funding for FDA food safety programs over the past 3 years have barely kept up with inflation, which
means that these programs have had no capacity to address the increasing challenges in food safety.
6According to USDA’s Economic Research Service, approximately 15 percent of the nation’s
food supply is imported.24 However, the country relies more heavily on imports for certain
types of foods.  For instance, 60 percent of the fresh fruits and vegetables consumed in the
U.S. are imported, as is 75 percent of the seafood Americans consume.25
Currently, FDA and the U.S. Customs Border and Protection enter data on all U.S. food
imports into a database system that electronically screens paperwork on shipments to deter-
mine whether their contents might pose a risk to the public’s health.  Imported goods that
trigger concern can be physically inspected, but due to limited resources, FDA only inspects
approximately one percent of shipments.
In addition, of the thousands of foreign food manufacturing facilities that export food to the
U.S., FDA only conducts approximately 100 inspections a year. The current paradigm for 
protecting foreign foods places the responsibility for catching problems onto FDA through
infrequent and inadequate inspections, instead of setting up a more strategic regulatory 
system where FDA sets standards for food processors that they can then hold industry
accountable for meeting those standards.
The majority of U.S. food imports go straight to Americans’ plates without any domestic pro-
cessing and related FDA oversight. Given that FDA “often has very limited information
regarding conditions under which most food is produced in foreign countries,” this may mean
that these foods pose a higher-risk to the consumer. 26
In light of growing concerns regarding the safety of imported goods, the Bush Administration
released its Import Safety Action Plan in November 2007.  The Plan is integrated with the
FDA’s Food Protection Plan, also released in November.  The Food Protection Plan discusses
the need to build safety into the entire food supply chain -- including imported foods.  The Plan
directs FDA to “work with foreign governments, which have a greater ability to oversee manu-
facturers within their borders to ensure compliance with safety standards.”27
The Plan, however, fails to call for accountability on the part of the food importers to ensure
that preventive action is taking place in the country of origin.  According to Michael Taylor,
former FDA Deputy Commissioner for Policy, “FDA will never have enough resources to
police and ensure the safety of imports without harnessing the expertise and efforts of the
private sector and making a U.S.-based entity legally accountable for ensuring prevention is
‘built-in’ for imports, just as it should be for domestically produced food.”28
Until food importers are legally accountable for assuring that foreign growers, producers and
processors are shipping goods to the U.S. that meet U.S. food safety standards, it is unlikely
that the quality and safety of U.S. food imports will improve.  
IMPORTED FOOD
7Agroterrorism is the “deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing econom-
ic losses, and/or undermining stability.”29  
RECENT THREATS, EXISTING VULNERABILITIES
Contaminated Wheat Gluten
Americans witnessed the real danger of deliberate food con-
tamination in early 2007, when thousands of cats and dogs
were sickened and died after ingesting pet food that had been
contaminated with melamine, a nitrogen-rich chemical used
to make plastic and sometimes as a fertilizer.35 Although U.S.
officials did not call this contamination malicious or agroter-
rorist in nature, some experts believe it was done for eco-
nomic gain by exporters who substituted wheat gluten with
melamine.36 A U.S. federal grand jury recently indicted 2
Chinese businessmen and their firms, along with a U.S. com-
pany and its president and chief executive officer, for their
roles in a scheme to import products purported to be wheat
gluten into the U.S. that were contaminated with melamine.37
Botulism
Botulism is a “paralytic illness caused by a nerve toxin that
is produced by the bacterium Clostridium botulinum.”38
Although botulism is a naturally occurring toxin, there are
serious concerns that it could be used as a weapon.  A July
2005 issue of the Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences outlined a relatively easy and potentially devastating
method using botulism to kill thousands of people and disrupt
the U.S. economy.  The study, conducted by Stanford
Graduate School of Business Professor Lawrence M. Wein,
determined that “a mere 4 grams of botulinum toxin dropped
into a milk production facility could cause serious illness and
even death for 400,000 people in the United States.”39
The report recommended that FDA make current volunteer
safety guidelines mandatory, “such as requiring that milk tanks
and trucks be locked and that 2 people be present when milk
is transferred from one stage of the supply chain to the next.
Before releasing milk into silos, milk-tank truck drivers should
be required to employ a new 15-minute test that can detect
the 4 types of toxins associated with human botulism.”40
The deliberate contamination of our nation’s food supply is a
serious threat that could have a quick, widespread impact.  In
January 2004, the Bush Administration responded to this very
real threat with Homeland Security Presidential Directive/
HSPD- 9, “Defense of United States Agriculture and Food.”30
This directive calls for a coordinated national approach to
countering threats to the food supply.  HSPD-9 directed U.S.
agencies to protect the food supply by:
 Identifying and prioritizing sector-critical infrastructure and
key resources for establishing protection requirements; 
 Developing awareness and early warning capabilities to
recognize threats;
 Mitigating vulnerabilities at critical production and pro-
cessing nodes; 
 Enhancing screening procedures for domestic and import-
ed products; and
 Enhancing response and recovery procedures.31
The directive tasked the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) with leading national food defense efforts, 
while working in coordination with USDA, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), and EPA.  
Despite increased responsibility and concern, FDA has not
received additional funding to support food-related anti-ter-
rorism activities, and USDA has only received an additional
$150 million.
One tool used by FDA and FSIS is CARVER + Shock, a com-
puter program that assesses the vulnerabilities within a food
supply system and infrastructure to an attack.32 Interested
parties work with food safety officials on a voluntary basis to
identify weaknesses in their systems.  Once these vulnerabil-
ities are identified, food growers, producers and manufactur-
ers can “focus resources on protecting the most susceptible
points in their system.”33 Food safety officials, however, cur-
rently have no means to ensure that farmers and manufac-
turers implement measures to protect the food supply.
In fact, the November 2007 FDA Food Protection Plan stated that
additional legislative authority is needed to give FDA the power to
“implement measures solely intended to protect against the inten-
tional adulteration of food by terrorists or criminals.”34
FOOD DEFENSE
8A number of problems are created by the cur-
rent food safety laws being out of date.
Resources and attention are being spent on
food safety issues that are no longer signifi-
cant threats to our food supply, but these
practices are required under current law and
policies.  The current statutes require wasting
resources on antiquated activities.  And, while
most food safety resources are going to sup-
port outdated problems, new problems are
not receiving adequate attention or funds.   
Outdated Laws and Policies
FSIS spends most of its resources inspecting every beef and pork carcass in ways not too differ-
ent from practices used 100 years ago, based on the agency’s mandate from Congress.
Current laws, in effect since 1906, require carcass-by-carcass and daily inspections of meat and
poultry to check for animal diseases, although the health of animals coming to slaughter has
greatly improved in modern times due to changes in agricultural practices and technologies.  
While the agency focuses virtually all of its resources and efforts on slaughter and processing plants, it
lacks many modern tools necessary to improve public health protection, such as clear legal authority
to set binding standards and practices for reducing pathogen contamination in raw products; it lacks
any legal authority to act on the farm, where some of the most significant meat and poultry safety haz-
ards originate; and it is given few resources to oversee what happens to the safety of products after
they leave inspected plants, such as during transport, storage and commercial handling at retail.  
For example, FSIS spends approximately $1 billion to regulate meat, poultry, and processed egg
products, even though many of these regulation practices are considered obsolete.  In fact, about
3,000 of the 7,600 USDA inspectors (and a commensurate share of the $1 billion spent on USDA
inspections) are currently devoted to a poultry slaughter inspection practice that has been consid-
ered obsolete for more than 20 years.  The practice involves 2 seconds of visual inspection for every
one of the 8 billion chickens produced annually in the U.S.  Modern agricultural practices make the
need for this type of inspection obsolete, while no inspection practice has been developed to address
the current health threat from poultry products -- bacteria that cause disease, including Salmonella.
OUTDATED PRACTICES AT FSIS, REQUIRED BY LAW
Current statutes that provide the foundation for FDA’s food safety functions date back to 1906 and 1938.
Unlike USDA’s inspection mandates, FDA’s law sets forth a system that is largely reactive to problems
prevalent in an early twentieth century agricultural and food system, such as adulteration and misbrand-
ing. It empowers FDA primarily to act only after food safety problems occur, rather than prevent them. 
These laws permit FDA to inspect processing plants and warehouses and remove harmful or poten-
tially harmful food from the market through court enforcement action and to block imports if it detects
potential problems.  FDA’s functional powers and effectiveness are limited, however, because:
 Congress has not provided the agency with a modern, public health mandate to prevent
foodborne illness;  
 Congress has not updated the agency’s legal tools to meet the challenges of a high-tech,
globalized food supply; and 
 Congress has not provided the funding stream FDA needs to carry out research, standard
setting, and inspection at a level commensurate with today’s food safety challenge. 
“The near unanimity about the agency’s weaknesses -- among Congressional Democrats and
Republicans, industry and consumer groups, and authoritative independent analysts -- is striking.
But hand wringing is not enough. The FDA desperately needs an infusion of money and talent.”41
-- New York Times Editorial
FDA’S CFSAN NO MATCH FOR MODERN THREATS
9Despite the statutory and resource constraints under which they operate, FSIS and FDA have
made efforts to modernize their food safety programs. The most prominent example of this is
the institution of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) as a regulatory stan-
dard for some sectors of the food system.
HACCP is a food industry-developed, science-based approach that focuses on identifying and
minimizing hazards throughout the production and processing system, rather than relying
solely on the traditional techniques of food inspection, which focus on end-product testing
and are largely reactive rather than preventive.  HACCP controls are designed, validated and
implemented to prevent or minimize potential hazards, and these controls are continuously
verified and monitored by the food processor and subject to inspection by regulatory agency.  
The HACCP system can be adapted to fit the different production and processing procedures
of different types of foods.  FDA requires HACCP for seafood (1995) and juice (2001), while
FSIS requires it for meat and poultry (1996).42
PIECEMEAL MODERNIZATION:  THE EXAMPLE OF HAZARD ANALYSIS
AND CRITICAL CONTROL POINT (HACCP)
 E. coli O157:H7 originates in the gut of cattle and other mammals but, with manure as its
vehicle, spreads throughout the food supply, contaminating meat, fresh produce, juice, and
other foods.  FSIS is responsible for inspecting meat and poultry plants but is not empow-
ered to deal directly and preventively with the problem on the farm.  FDA regulates pro-
duce but has ambiguous legal authority and no clear mandate to set safety standards for
animal producers and growers of fruits and vegetables.  CDC works with state and local
health departments to investigate outbreaks but cannot act preventively.  
 FDA regulates frozen pizza. However, if the pizza is topped with 2 percent or more of
cooked meat or poultry, then FSIS is the regulatory agency.  Inspections at pizza production
facilities follow 2 sets of guidelines, one issued from FDA and one from USDA.43 And, FSIS
inspects plants making pepperoni pizza every day, after it has already inspected the manufac-
ture of the pepperoni on a daily basis and the slaughter of every animal used to make the
pepperoni, while FDA inspects cheese pizza plants on average once every 10 years.44
 A decade ago, concerns about produce safety became prominent, as federal, state, and
local health officials began seeing more frequent produce-related outbreaks.  FDA respond-
ed by issuing in collaboration with USDA a guidance document outlining general principles
for minimizing microbial food safety hazards in fresh fruits and vegetables.  
This included guidance on “good agricultural practices” for managing manure, irrigation
water, worker hygiene and other safety-related practices on the farm, as well as sanitation
during processing and transportation.  Experts considered these recommended principles
sound but limited.  In many cases, the guidance lacked the specificity required to make
them actionable, in part because not enough research has been done to establish credible
and effective criteria or performance standards for implementing the broad principles.
While many producers and processors likely made good faith efforts to comply with FDA’s
guidance, it has failed to drive widespread change.
EXAMPLES OF THE NEED FOR MODERNIZING AND INTEGRATING 
THE FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM
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The systems used to monitor the safety of the nation’s food supply is a patchwork of various
government agencies at the federal, state, and local level working largely independently, with
limited coordination, alongside food safety practitioners from the private sector, public inter-
est groups, and academia -- all of whom collect and use food safety information for a wide
variety of purposes.  
This group of diverse actors includes, but is not limited to:
 FDA, CDC, USDA, and EPA at the federal level;
 Departments of health, agriculture and the environment and public health laboratories
across the 50 states;
 Over 3,000 local health departments and retail inspection agencies;
 Millions of agricultural producers; hundreds of thousands of food processors, retailers and
restaurants; and dozens of associations representing various segments of the food and agri-
culture industry;
 A wide range of government and university-based food safety researchers; and
 An active community of consumer representatives and organized victims of foodborne illness.   
The fragmented nature of the current food safety surveillance system complicates efforts by
food safety regulators to share data in a timely and efficient manner.  These challenges
include, but are not limited to:
 The analysis of data on a variety of subjects, ranging from foodborne illness disease rates to
the cost of preventive action.
 Data collection that is spread across various disciplines including public health epidemiology,
medical research, microbiology, risk analysis, and economics.  
 Multiple actors in this complex food safety surveillance system that are only loosely affiliat-
ed with one another and are not accountable to any one oversight body or agency.
 A surveillance system that is designed to respond to foodborne illness outbreaks, rather than
gather the data that would help government and industry design effective prevention strategies.
 Institutional issues that impede data sharing among government agencies and private sector.
For example, government agencies face legal restrictions on data sharing.  In the event that
legal restrictions do not hinder data sharing, agencies may be reluctant to share data they
consider to be their own.  For the private sector there are competitive business reasons
for firms to withhold food safety information, while university-based researchers may col-
lect a lot of data but only publish bits and pieces of their results.  
There are no easy solutions to these barriers.  However, initial steps to address these issues
include a recognition that a problem exists and buy-in from key leaders at relevant agencies to
do something about this problem.  Once there is support from the leadership at the govern-
ment agencies, the next steps include legislative action to: 1) mandate coordinated data col-
lection among government agencies, and 2) improve the collection of and accessibility to data
in a timely and efficient manner.  At the same time, action should be taken by leading food
safety officials to build a network-of-networks among all actors in the food safety system,
including private sector and academia.  
HOW IS THE SAFETY OF OUR FOOD MONITORED FOR 
DISEASE OUTBREAKS?  
11
The current decentralized governmental
food safety system means state and local gov-
ernments have jurisdiction for food safety
issues in their communities beyond those
that are directly regulated and monitored by
federal agencies.
In lieu of official required national standards,
2 voluntary efforts have been developed to try
to create more uniform standards and prac-
tices as well as enhancing the efficiency and
effectiveness of the nation’s food safety sys-
tem:  FDA’s Food Code and a Voluntary
National Retail Food Regulatory Program.
FDA’s Food Code is intended to serve as a
model “that assists food control jurisdictions
at all levels of government by providing them
with a scientifically sound technical and legal
basis for regulating the retail and food service
segment of the industry (restaurants and gro-
cery stores and institutions such as nursing
homes).”45 The Food Code does not attempt
to regulate food processors or growers.  
The Food Code is updated periodically to
provide the most current food safety provi-
sions to state and local agencies.  FDA gets
feedback from many organizations on its
code, including the Conference for Food
Protection, a group of state and federal offi-
cials, industry representatives, consumer
groups, and academic officials that meets
every 2 years to recommend Code changes.
The Conference seeks to balance the inter-
ests of industry with those of food safety offi-
cials and consumer groups.  Despite this,
food safety advocates have criticized FDA for
relying too heavily on industry at the
expense of consumer groups.  
Many states revise and update their own
codes after FDA publishes a new version of
the  Food Code, although this is done on a
voluntary basis.  The most recent version of
the Food Code was issued in 2005 and the
next version is due out in 2009.
All but four states have adopted codes pat-
terned after the 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001
or 2005 versions of the Food Code.  The four
states that have not adopted any version of the
Food Code -- California, Kentucky, Maryland,
and North Carolina -- are taking steps towards
adopting the voluntary standards.  
Inadequate Federal, State, and Local Collaboration
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STATUS OF STATE FOOD CODE ADOPTIONS
State 2005 2001 1999 1997 1995 1993
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California
Colorado 
Connecticut  
Delaware 
District of Columbia 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah  
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin  
Wyoming 
Source:  FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition46
The FDA, in collaboration with federal, state,
and local regulatory agencies, industry, trade
associations, academic, and consumers, has
also established a Voluntary National Retail
Food Regulatory Program.  The program’s
goal is to reduce or eliminate the occurrence
of illnesses and deaths from food produced
or handled at the retail level.47
The program seeks to provide state and
local food regulatory officials with science-
based measures of performance that will
lead to more effective and uniform regula-
tion of the food industry.
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Participation in the program is voluntary.  To
be part of the program, the jurisdiction must
carry out an initial self-assessment of its retail
food safety program within 12 months of
enrollment in the program, conduct self-
assessments every 36 months after that, and
submit to verification audits by outside parties.   
Status of States Enrolled in Voluntary National Retail Regulatory Program
State State Agency Self-Assessment Achieved at least 1 Achievement 
Enrolled Completed of 9 Standards Based Verified by 
on Self-Assessment External Evaluator
Alabama  
Alaska    
Arizona* 
Arkansas   
California   
Colorado  
Connecticut   
Delaware 
District of Columbia 
Florida    
Georgia    
Hawaii   
Idaho    
Illinois   
Indiana
Iowa    
Kansas    
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland   
Massachusetts    
Michigan    
Minnesota   
Mississippi   
Missouri    
Montana   
Nebraska   
Nevada   
New Hampshire
New Jersey 
New Mexico   
New York
North Carolina    
North Dakota
Ohio   
Oklahoma   
Oregon    
Pennsylvania   
Rhode Island   
South Carolina
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas    
Utah 
Vermont
Virginia 
Washington
West Virginia 
Wisconsin   
Wyoming   
Source:  FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition.48 Note: *No state-wide agency is enrolled in the program.  However,
11 of 15 counties in Arizona are enrolled.  Of the 11 counties, 5 have had their achievements verified by an outside auditor.
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1. Regulatory Foundation 
2. Trained Regulatory Staff 
3. Inspection Program Based on HACCP
Principles 
4. Uniform Inspection Program 
5. Foodborne Illness and Food Security
Preparedness and Response 
6. Compliance and Enforcement 
7. Industry and Community Relations 
8. Program Support and Resources 
9. Program Assessment 
STANDARDS FOR THE VOLUNTARY NATIONAL RETAIL FOOD
REGULATORY PROGRAM
II. An Overview of Foodborne Disease Threats
 Agriculture today is primarily based on a large-scale agribusiness model.  As consolidation
(shifting away from the single-family farm) has taken place, certain livestock or crops are
increasingly centralized in specific regions and even certain farms.  For example in 1990, 74
percent of all wet corn (a popular livestock feed) was milled by the top 4 processing firms
in only 15 facilities.49 Five million head of cattle were fattened by the top 30 feedlots in
1998.50 And 83 percent of all beef in the U.S. was processed by the largest 5 beef packers
in 32 plants.51 This centralization can facilitate the spread of disease because there is signifi-
cant contact between livestock or crops, which can lead to a single infected animal or con-
taminated product causing widespread damage.
 As specialized centers of activity have developed throughout the nation, livestock rearing has
changed from a localized process to a geographically dispersed effort.  An animal is most
likely born on a breeding farm, at which point it is shuttled to a different farm for fattening,
and then transported again for slaughter and processing.  The carcass may even be sent to
another state for disposal.52 In addition, animals are frequently shown or displayed at region-
al shows or auctions.  This mingling of animals from various regions of the country, as well as
the widespread distribution networks of the industry, can accelerate the spread of disease.
 Many countries have adopted sophisticated systems of animal identification and tracking that
are important to identify and isolate sources and spread of diseases in an animal population.
However, the U.S. is dramatically behind in this effort, promoting a voluntary system that is
decades behind some of our trading partners, and provides inadequate protection to the
nation’s farmers and consumers.
FDA’S MAJOR CONCERNS RELATED TO FOOD PROCESSING,
PACKAGING, TRANSPORTATION, AND PREPARATION53
 Biological pathogens (e.g., bacteria,
viruses, parasites) 
Naturally occurring toxins (e.g., mycotoxins,
ciguatera toxin, paralytic shellfish poison) 
 Dietary supplements (e.g., ephedra) 
 Pesticide residues 
 Toxic metals (e.g., lead, mercury) 
 Decomposition and filth (e.g., insect
fragments) 
 Food allergens (e.g., eggs, peanuts,
wheat, milk) 
 Nutrient concerns (e.g., vitamin D
overdose, pediatric iron toxicity) 
Dietary components (e.g., fat, cholesterol) 
 Radionuclides 
 TSE-type diseases (e.g., chronic wasting
disease in deer) 
 Product tampering 
AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY AND FOOD SAFETY
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E. coli 0157:H7
In the late summer and early fall of 2006, nearly 200 people became sick and at least 3 died
due to E. coli contamination in spinach.  It is possible that even more illnesses or deaths were
related to the outbreak as “officials believe that for every E. coli case reported, 20 go unre-
ported.”58 Illnesses associated with E. coli often also go undiagnosed.59, 60
“Escherichia coli O157:H7 (E. coli) is a leading cause of foodborne illness.”61 E. coli is most
contracted through “eating undercooked, contaminated ground beef... (or) eating con-
taminated bean sprouts or fresh leafy vegetables such as lettuce and spinach.  Person-to-
person contact in families and child care centers is also a known mode of transmission.”62
The deaths and illnesses from the spinach have led to a renewed call for increased regulation.
FDA does not inspect produce on a similar scale as USDA’s inspection of beef, and it has fewer
inspectors and more facilities to inspect than it did in 2003.63 Additionally, “more outbreaks of
the disease are now traced to produce than to meat, poultry, fish, eggs, and milk combined.”64
In August 2006, just prior to the outbreaks, FDA launched a Lettuce Safety Initiative to
respond to recurring outbreaks of E. coli in lettuce.65 The initiative focused first on California
regions, where a large portion of past outbreaks have occurred (including the most recent
spinach outbreak), and concentrates on the following objectives: 
 Assessing industry approaches and actions.
 Early detection and rapid response.
 Observing and identifying practices that might lead to contamination.
 Consideration of regulatory action.66
“In the last 20 years, the incidence of produce-related food-borne illness has 
increased 21⁄2 to 3 times.”67
— Richard H. Linton, director of the Center for Food Safety Engineering at Purdue University
HIGH MERCURY LEVELS IN SEAFOOD
Although mercury occurs naturally in the environment, it is also released into the air through
industrial pollution.  The mercury then falls from the air and can accumulate in streams and
oceans, becoming methylmercury. Fish absorb the methylmercury as they feed in these waters
and over time it builds up in them.  Some fish, particularly larger fish such as swordfish and king
mackerel, are more susceptible to high levels of methylmercury based on what they eat.54
According to EPA it has been demonstrated that high levels of methylmercury in the
bloodstream of unborn babies and young children may harm the developing nervous sys-
tem, making the child less able to think and learn.55 More recent studies have suggested a
link between mercury and poor health outcomes in adults, including increased risk of car-
diovascular disease and neurological symptoms.56
In 2004, FDA and EPA warned women who might become pregnant and children to limit
their consumption of canned and fresh tuna to 6 ounces a week due to high mercury lev-
els.  In fact, a recent analysis by The New York Times and the Environmental and
Occupational Health Sciences Institute in New Jersey found levels of mercury in tuna
sushi far higher than the amount typically found in canned tuna.57
Although FDA officials have not commented on these findings, the agency has said it is
reviewing its seafood mercury warnings.
EXAMPLES OF POTENTIAL DISEASE THREATS 
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Hepatitis A
In January 2008, a produce handler at a grocery store in Buffalo, New York was diagnosed with
hepatitis A.  As a precaution, county health officials issued a warning to anyone who may have
purchased and consumed certain kinds of produce from the store in the prior 3-week period.
Health officials set up free clinics to distribute hepatitis A vaccine and immune globulin (IG) shots.
More than 8,300 people were vaccinated over a 5-day period at a cost of some $500,000.  
Hepatitis A is a viral infection that causes inflammation of the liver and can result in short-
term illness.68 Transmission occurs by the fecal-oral route, either by direct contact with an
infected person or by ingestion of contaminated food or water. Although foodborne or
waterborne hepatitis A outbreaks are relatively uncommon in the United States, food
handlers with hepatitis A are frequently identified.69
The majority of foodborne hepatitis A outbreaks are associated with infected food handlers
working in grocery stores and restaurants, such as the case in Buffalo.  A single infected indi-
vidual can transmit hepatitis A to dozens, if not hundreds of persons.70
Hepatitis A outbreaks have also been associated with fresh produce that was contaminated
sometime during growing, harvesting or processing.  In 2003, more than 500 individuals in 6
states were infected by eating contaminated green onions.  Three individuals died as a result.71
Hepatitis A contaminated shellfish have also been the source of outbreaks, although the last
reported U.S. outbreak occurred in 1988.72
Hepatitis A is the only common vaccine-preventable foodborne disease in the U.S., although
only children under the age of 2 are routinely vaccinated.73 Instead of widespread vaccination,
scientists believe reducing foodborne transmission of hepatitis A can be achieved by improving
sanitary conditions in food production and encouraging routine proper food-handler hygiene.  
Listeria
Listeria monocytogenes (LM), a harmful bacterium, causes some 2,500 illnesses and 500 deaths
in the U.S. each year.74 LM, which can be present in soil and water, has been found in a vari-
ety of raw foods, such as uncooked meats and vegetables.  Processed foods can also become
contaminated with LM, particularly deli meats and unpasteurized cheeses.    
Listeriosis is a serious infection caused by eating food contaminated with the bacterium
Listeria monocytogenes.  Symptoms include fever, muscle aches, nausea, and diarrhea.
Infected pregnant women can pass the illness on to the fetus which can result in miscar-
riage or stillbirth, premature delivery or infection of the newborn.75
Voluntary recalls of food products contaminated with LM, or suspected to be contaminated
with LM, are frequent.  On March 3, 2008 Costco Wholesale recalled 10,000 pounds of frozen
chicken entrees produced in Washington State and distributed across the Pacific Northwest.76
A day earlier, a Michigan firm recalled some 2,000 pounds of frozen chicken entrees that were
possibly contaminated with LM, while in November 2007, a Texas producer recalled some
98,000 pounds of frozen sausage roll products thought to be contaminated with LM.77
Although healthy people rarely contract listeriosis, pregnant women, newborns, the elderly
and persons with compromised immune systems are at highest risk of infection.  The medical
community recommends that those people at risk avoid high risk foods such as deli meats,
pates and other processed meats, and unpasteurized cheese, and practice good hygiene when
cooking -- washing hands after handling meat or poultry; keeping raw meat and poultry away
from foods that won’t be cooked; cleaning all cooking utensils in hot soapy water.
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Salmonella
In February 2007, FDA issued a nationwide advisory warning consumers to avoid certain brands of
peanut butter due to risk of contamination with Salmonella Tennessee, a subtype of the Salmonella
bacteria, after 290 people in 39 states were sickened from the contaminated food.78 Although 46
people were hospitalized as a result, there were no deaths associated with the contamination.  
Salmonella live in the intestinal tracts of humans and other animals, including birds, and
the germ is usually passed to humans by eating foods contaminated with animal feces.79
Most people infected with Salmonella develop diarrhea, fever and stomach cramps 12 to
72 hours after infection.80
Each year, some 40,000 cases of Salmonella infection are reported in the U.S., although scien-
tists believe the actual number of infections is much higher as mild cases often go unreported.
Children, the elderly and the immuno-compromised  are the most likely to have severe infec-
tions.  CDC estimates that some 600 persons die from acute Salmonella infection each year.  
As with many foodborne illnesses, good hygiene and safe kitchen practices can do a lot to
prevent illness.  For example, proper cooking of meat, poultry and eggs can significantly
reduce the risks associated with those foods.
Mad Cow Disease
In March 2006, the USDA announced that a cow in Alabama tested positive for bovine spongi-
form encephalopathy (BSE), better known as mad cow disease.  The Alabama cow was the third
such case in the U.S., with the first case occurring in Washington state in December 2003.81, 82
Mad cow is a fatal illness that strikes the central nervous system of cattle.  Humans can contract
a related illness called variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD) by eating infected beef.
Also in 2003, a single cow in Canada was diagnosed with mad cow disease, leading many nations
(including the U.S.) to place a ban on Canadian cattle and beef imports.  Economic losses due to
the import bans have been massive, with estimates ranging from $1.6 to $3.2 billion.83,84
If a significant outbreak of mad cow disease occurred in the U.S., the USDA estimates that
there would be a loss of $15 billion, resulting from a 24 percent decline in domestic beef sales
and an 80 percent decline in beef and live cattle exports.85 Slaughter and disposal costs of at-
risk cattle could add up to an additional $12 billion.86 Experts point out that generally concerns
about mad cow are related to animal health rather than human health in the U.S.
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A large number of food advisories and recalls are due to adulterated food, which runs the gamut
from food that is improperly inspected to food that is contaminated with a foreign substance.87,88
Prevention and stringent controls at the manufacturer level are the keys to reducing the num-
ber of incidents of adulteration.
Under FDA’s food safety statute, food is considered “adulterated” if:89,90,91
 It bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance that may render it injurious to health;
 It bears or contains any added poisonous or deleterious substance other than pesticide
residue, food additive, color additive, or new animal drug (which are covered by separate
provisions) that is unsafe;
 Its container is composed in whole or in part of any poisonous or deleterious substance
that may render the contents injurious to health;
 It bears or contains a pesticide chemical residue that is unsafe (EPA establishes tolerance
for pesticide residues in food, which is enforced by the FDA).
 It is, or it bears or contains, an unsafe food additive;
 It is, or it bears or contains, an unsafe new animal drug;
 It is, or it bears or contains, an unsafe color additive;
 It consists, in whole or in part, of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance or is otherwise
unfit for food; 
 It has been prepared, packed or held under unsanitary conditions (insect, rodent, or bird infes-
tation) whereby it may have become contaminated with filth or rendered injurious to health;
 It has been irradiated and the irradiation processing was not done in conformity with a regula-
tion permitting irradiation of the food (with exceptions approved by FDA including refrigerat-
ed or frozen uncooked meat, fresh or frozen uncooked poultry, and seeds for sprouting);
 It contains a dietary ingredient that presents a significant or unreasonable risk of illness or
injury under the conditions of use recommended in labeling;
 A valuable constituent has been omitted in whole or in part or replaced with another sub-
stance; damage or inferiority has been concealed in any manner; or a substance has been
added to increase the product’s bulk or weight, reduce its quality or strength, or make it
appear of greater value than it is; or
 It is offered for import into the U.S. and is a food that has previously been refused admission,
unless the person reoffering the food establishes that is in compliance with U.S. law.
ADULTERATED FOOD
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Amebiasis (Entamoeba histolytica Infection) [parasitic]
Anisakiasis (Anisakis Infection) [parasitic]
Ascariasis (Intestinal Roundworm Infection) [parasitic]
Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxicity) [bacterial]
Brainerd Diarrhea [bacterial]
Brucellosis (Brucella Infection) [bacterial]
Campylobacteriosis (Campylobacter Infection) [bacterial]
Cholera (Vibrio cholerae Infection) [bacterial]
Cryptosporidiosis (Cryptosporidium Infection) [parasitic]
Cyclosporiasis (Cyclospora Infection) [parasitic]
Cysticercosis (Neurocysticercosis) [parasitic]
Diphyllobothriasis (Diphyllobothrium infection) [parasitic]
Enterohemorrhagic Escherichia coli [bacterial]
Enterotoxogenic Escherichia coli (ETEC) [bacterial]
Escherichia coli O157:H7 [bacterial]
Giardiasis (Giardia Infection) [parasitic]
Helicobacter pylori [bacterial] 
Hepatitis A [viral]
Listeriosis (Listeria Infection) [bacterial]
Marine Toxins [non-infectious]
Norovirus [viral]
Rotavirus [viral]
Salmonella Enteritidis [bacterial]
Salmonellosis (Salmonella Infection) [bacterial]
Shigellosis (Shigella Infection) [bacterial]
Toxoplasmosis (Toxoplasma Infection) [parasitic]
Trichinellosis/Trichinosis (Trichinella Infection) [parasitic]
Typhoid Fever ( Salmonella Typhi Infection) [bacterial] 
Vibrio parahaemolyticus  [bacterial]
Vibrio vulnificus [bacterial] 
Viral Gastroenteritis [viral] 
Yersiniosis (Yersinia enterocolitica Infection) [bacterial]
CDC’S LIST OF MAJOR CAUSES OF FOODBORNE ILLNESS:  
BACTERIAL, PARASITIC, VIRAL, AND NON-INFECTIOUS92
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Modernizing the food safety system could
significantly decrease the number of food-
borne illnesses in the U.S. each year and
help restore public confidence in the system
and in the safety of food.  
Action must be taken to realign U.S. food safe-
ty policies with current priorities and threats.
The nation should focus on building a mod-
ern food safety system that emphasizes:
 Farm-to-Fork Disease Prevention
Practices:  Food safety priorities must
shift from a system focused on outdated,
limited end-product and processing plant
inspections to a system where the empha-
sis is on preventing outbreaks and illness-
es throughout the entire food production
process and supply chain. 
 Preventive strategies, such as the
Hazard Analysis and Critical Point
(HACCP) process, should be at the
center of food safety practices.
Outdated practices, like those called
for in the current the FSIS inspection
mandate, should be repealed.
 Uniform performance standards and
best practices should be defined and
adopted, and should be enforceable,
including detention and recall author-
ity, records access, establishment regis-
tration, and civil penalty authority.
 Food safety education programs for
commercial food handlers and con-
sumers are essential components of
preventing disease.  
 The Ability to Keep Pace with Modern
Threats: Threats to the food supply
change as industry practices and farming
and processing technologies change.
Government strategies for protecting and
inspecting the food supply must be able
to adapt quickly to these changes.   
 Ongoing research is needed to identify
emerging threats and up-to-date ways
to contain them.  
Government food safety officials and
food companies must be able to keep
track of information about disease out-
breaks in humans, plants, and animals
and results of food inspections so they
can quickly detect and contain problems.  
Monitoring Foreign Imports and
International Practices:  Food safety agen-
cies must have clear statutory authority and
receive resources necessary to educate
overseas regulators and food producers
about U.S. food safety standards, require
that food importers demonstrate these
standards are being met, and permit U.S.
regulators to inspect foreign establish-
ments as well as food at the port of entry.
Food safety agencies should also be given
the authority and funding to participate in
international negotiations and discussions,
such as with the Codex Alimentarius
Commission and the World Trade
Organization.  Trade agencies often take
the lead in these discussions, but often lack
the food safety mission, expertise, and cred-
ibility to effectively represent U.S. interests.
To accomplish these goals:
 Start by Strengthening FDA and Aligning
Resources with the Highest-Risk Threats:
Funding for FDA’s food program must
grow substantially, at least doubling in real
terms over the next 5 years, and statutory
mandates should be updated to strengthen
the agency’s abilities to carry out preven-
tive efforts and oversee food imports.  FDA
is responsible for overseeing the biggest
threats to the country’s food safety, but the
agency lacks the resources and the man-
dates needed to carry out its programs and
adequately protect the nation from food-
borne disease threats. Government fund-
ing should be realigned so that it can be
strategically allocated to food safety
research, regulation, and education to
maximize reduction in foodborne disease.
Resources for inspections should be dis-
tributed and used in the manner most like-
ly to contribute to disease reduction.
III. Recommendations
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 As a Second Step, Strategically Realign
and Elevate Food Safety Functions at
HHS:  As immediate measures are taken
to strengthen current food safety func-
tions at FDA, steps should also be taken to
realign and elevate organizationally all of
the food regulatory functions at HHS.
Currently, FDA’s senior management
focus is split between regulating medical
products (drugs and devices) and food,
with its food functions typically taking the
backseat in terms of resources and man-
agement attention.  FDA’s food functions
should be brought together under unified
leadership, with a single official, reporting
to the Secretary, focusing full time on, and
being responsible and accountable for,
providing food safety leadership national-
ly and internationally and effectively
implementing a modern, prevention-ori-
ented food safety system.  Efforts should
also be made to better align the surveil-
lance functions at CDC with other federal
food safety efforts and with state and local
efforts in a way that provides more timely
and responsive reporting to allow public
health officials throughout the country to
better detect and control outbreaks.  
 Set a Long-Term Goal to Integrate
Federal Food Safety Agencies:  While the
immediate focus is on fixing FDA, in
order to strategically address food safety
concerns, make good use of federal
resources, and have stronger national and
international leadership, the goal over
time should be to consolidate and align
all federal food safety functions into a sin-
gle agency to increase effectiveness,
responsibility, and accountability.  This
agency could then address the food sup-
ply as a whole and set priorities accord-
ingly.  It should oversee regulation and
inspection, but also must also have
research and surveillance functions as
part of its mandate.  It should also be
required to report on accomplishments,
progress, and problems.
 The realigned agency should include:
FSIS; the food regulatory functions of
FDA, including CFSAN, the Center for
Veterinary Medicine, and the food
portion of FDA’s field resource; and
the food safety aspects of the EPA’s
pesticide program.  
 The placement of CDC’s foodborne
disease surveillance program should be
reviewed.  It must be able to function in
a way that not only monitors foodborne
disease outbreaks and helps investigate
preventive strategies but also provides
accountability to gauge how well U.S.
food safety systems are working.
In addition to changes at the federal level,
measures must be taken to better integrate
and coordinate policies and practices
among levels of government, including:
 Creating Uniform Standards and
Practices Across Federal-State-Local
Levels:  While the states play a critical
food safety role, particularly at the retail
level, the federal-state relationship is not
well defined or financed.  States should be
encouraged and incentivized to adopt and
comply with the uniform standards and
practices of the FDA’s Food Code and the
National Retail Food Regulatory Program.  
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In November 2007, HHS unveiled its plans to strengthen and update the U.S. food safety system.  
In order to make many of the necessary changes, the plan stresses the need to realign roles
and responsibilities within the agency and for legislative action.
 For instance, FDA is seeking legislative changes that will allow the agency to require food
facilities to renew their FDA registrations every 2 years, which the agency argues will allow
for superior prevention.  
 Also, among other recommended changes, FDA is urging Congress to empower the agency
to issue mandatory recalls of contaminated products when voluntary recalls fall short.
The Food Protection Plan was developed in conjunction with the broader U.S. Import Safety
Action Plan that focuses on how the U.S. can improve the safety of all imported products.  
The Food Protection Plan focuses FDA’s efforts on 3 critical areas: prevention; intervention;
and response.  According to FDA Commissioner Andrew von Eschenbach, while the FDA will
maintain and improve its response capacity, “the primary goal is to prevent contaminated food
from ever reaching the consumer.”94
Prevention
FDA will boost efforts to prevent food from becoming contaminated via a 3-pronged
approach of: 1) promoting increased corporate responsibility to prevent foodborne illnesses;
2) identifying food vulnerabilities and assessing risks; and 3) expanding the understanding and
use of proven mitigation strategies.
Intervention
FDA will intervene at critical points in the food supply chain from production to consumption.
Inspections will be based on risk assessments and enhanced risk-based surveillance.
Response
FDA intends to improve both the agency’s immediate response to a foodborne illness outbreak,
and its risk communication with the U.S. public, industry and other interested parties.
FDA’S FOOD PROTECTION PLAN93
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